HAZOP Action Tracker

POWERFUL CLOUD BASED HAZOP ACTION TRACKING

The Pisys 360 Action Tracker is heavily used for HAZID, ENVID, SIL, LOPA - in fact any process which generates critical actions ! It's used by Operators and contractors world-wide who appreciate its simplicity and ease of access.

  • Allocate actions to any required participant
  • Restrict action visibility to those who need to see them
  • Allow multiple review stages with accept/reject plus review comments
  • Keep stakeholders informed as actions progress
  • Action audit history is stored with each action
  • Attach additional information or evidence to actions
  • Capture additional information according to your specific requirements
  • Operate OFFLINE with lightweight templates and upload when you're back in the office - ideal for offsite studies

    • If you're a busy Chairman or scribe you've got enough on your plate without worrying about how HAZOP or HAZID ( or any other review type) actions are being recorded and managed

    EXCEL is really great for recording actions - but pretty unhelpful when you find you've got multiple actions with different deadlines and multiple review stages

    The Pisys HAZOP tracker (ATMS) provides a CENTRALISED and STRUCTURED way of recording and managing actions

     

    You'd expect a HAZOP tracker to include Elements, Nodes, Risks, Causes, Consequences, Deviations, Safeguards etc - but what if you need to record a specific external document reference or e.g. an attachment showing a P&ID. With the Pisys HAZOP tracker you can quickly add fields to capture just about any type of data you need

    Wood PLC case study - use of Action Tracking system

    See how Wood PLC use ATMS globally for HAZOP tracking

    Blog

    A complex manufacturing plant

    How CHAZOP & HAZOP Complement Each Other

    In the world of process safety and hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) are well-known and widely used. However, another valuable tool in the safety arsenal is the Control Hazard and Operability Study (CHAZOP). While both methodologies aim to enhance safety and operability, they focus on different aspects of the process and control systems. This post compares HAZOP and CHAZOP, their methodologies, applications, and how they complement each other in ensuring comprehensive process safety.

    What is HAZOP?

    A HAZOP, or Hazard and Operability Study, is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation. The primary goal is to identify and evaluate potential hazards and operability problems that could lead to unsafe conditions or sub-optimal performance.

    HAZOP Methodology

    1. Team-Based Approach: HAZOP involves a multidisciplinary team that brings together diverse expertise. This team typically includes process engineers, operators, safety professionals, and other relevant stakeholders.
    2. Guide Words: The study uses predefined guide words (e.g., “no,” “more,” “less,” “as well as”) to systematically examine each part of the process. These guide words help in generating possible deviations from normal operations.
    3. Nodes: The process is divided into manageable sections called nodes. Each node is examined for deviations using the guide words.
    4. Deviations and Consequences: For each deviation identified, the team assesses potential causes and consequences. They also consider existing safeguards and suggest additional measures if necessary.
    Objectives:
    • Identify potential hazards and operability issues.
    • Understand the causes and consequences of deviations.
    • Recommend modifications or additional safeguards to mitigate risks.
    Applications:

    HAZOP is widely used in various industries, including chemical processing, pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, and power generation. It is typically conducted during the design phase of a new process or when significant modifications are made to an existing process.

    Control process

    What is CHAZOP?

    A CHAZOP, or Control Hazard and Operability Study, focuses specifically on the control systems of a process. It examines the hardware and software used for process control, automation, and safety instrumented functions, aiming to identify potential control system failures that could impact safety and operability.

    CHAZOP Methodology

    1. Team-Based Approach: Similar to HAZOP, CHAZOP involves a multidisciplinary team. However, this team often includes control system engineers, software developers, instrumentation specialists, and IT professionals, in addition to process engineers and safety experts.
    2. Guide Words and Scenarios: CHAZOP uses guide words and predefined scenarios to examine potential failures in control systems. These scenarios might include software bugs, hardware malfunctions, network failures, and human-machine interface (HMI) issues.
    3. Nodes or Segments: The control system is divided into nodes or segments, such as individual control loops, safety instrumented systems (SIS), or communication networks. Each segment is examined for potential failures and their consequences.
    4. Failure Modes and Effects: For each identified failure mode, the team assesses the potential effects on the process and control system. They consider existing safeguards and recommend additional measures to enhance reliability and safety.
    Objectives:
    • Identify potential failures in control systems.
    • Assess the impact of control system failures on process safety and operability.
    • Recommend modifications or additional safeguards to mitigate risks associated with control system failures.
    Applications:

    CHAZOP is applied in industries with complex control systems, such as chemical processing, pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, power generation, and manufacturing. It is particularly valuable during the design and implementation of new control systems, as well as during major upgrades or modifications to existing systems.

    Both HAZOP and CHAZOP methodologies require a robust action tracking methodology to support the actions that will invariably be generated as a result of the studies. Please refer to our Action Tracker page for more information on our high-governance action tracker which is used worldwide for all kinds of process safety-related actions.

    Key Differences Between HAZOP and CHAZOP

    While both HAZOP and CHAZOP are essential for process safety, they differ significantly in their focus, methodology, and application.

    HAZOP v CHAZOP comparison table

    Complementary Roles of HAZOP and CHAZOP

    Despite their differences, HAZOP and CHAZOP are complementary tools in the process safety toolkit. HAZOP is often the first step in identifying potential hazards within the process itself, which then informs the need for reliable control systems. CHAZOP ensures that these control systems are designed and implemented to handle potential failures effectively.

    For example, a HAZOP study might identify a potential overpressure scenario in a chemical reactor. The study could recommend a safety instrumented function, such as a pressure relief valve, to mitigate this risk. A subsequent CHAZOP study would then examine the control system responsible for actuating the pressure relief valve, ensuring that the control logic, sensors, and actuators are reliable and can respond appropriately in the event of a pressure increase.

    By integrating HAZOP and CHAZOP, organisations can achieve a comprehensive understanding of their process risks and ensure that both the process and the control systems are robust and reliable. This integration is critical for achieving a high level of safety and operational reliability.

    Case Study: Integrating HAZOP and CHAZOP

    Consider a pharmaceutical manufacturing facility undergoing a major upgrade to its control system. The facility uses automated processes for mixing and reacting chemical ingredients. Here’s how HAZOP and CHAZOP can be integrated:

    1. HAZOP Study: The multidisciplinary team conducts a HAZOP study on the new process design. They identify potential hazards, such as incorrect ingredient addition, temperature deviations, and pressure build-ups. The team recommends additional safeguards, including automated shutdown systems and enhanced monitoring.
    2. CHAZOP Study: Following the HAZOP, a CHAZOP study is conducted on the upgraded control system. The team examines the control logic, HMI, network reliability, and software integrity. They identify potential failure modes, such as software bugs that could lead to incorrect ingredient mixing or network failures that could disrupt monitoring.
    3. Integration and Mitigation: The findings from both studies are integrated. The process engineers and control system engineers collaborate to ensure that the control system enhancements align with the HAZOP recommendations. Additional safeguards, such as redundant sensors and fail-safe mechanisms, are implemented to address the identified risks.
    4. Testing and Validation: Before full implementation, the integrated system undergoes rigorous testing and validation. This includes simulation of potential failure scenarios identified in both HAZOP and CHAZOP studies to ensure that the system responds correctly and safely.
    5. Ongoing Monitoring and Review: After implementation, the facility establishes a routine for ongoing monitoring and periodic reviews. This ensures that both the process and control systems continue to operate safely and efficiently, and any new risks are promptly addressed.

    pharmaceutical process

    Conclusion

    HAZOP and CHAZOP are both integral to managing process safety, but they serve distinct purposes and are used at different stages of the safety lifecycle. HAZOP focuses on identifying and analysing potential hazards and operability issues within the process itself, while CHAZOP focuses on ensuring that the control systems are robust and reliable.

    Understanding the differences between these methodologies and how they complement each other is essential for anyone involved in process safety. By leveraging both HAZOP and CHAZOP, organisations can effectively identify hazards, assess risks, and implement robust safety systems that protect people, the environment, and assets. This holistic approach to safety ensures that both the physical process and the control systems are designed, implemented, and maintained to the highest standards, thereby achieving a comprehensive and effective safety management system.

    IBM Maximo

    Understanding the Differences Between HAZOP and SIL

    Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) analysis are both methodologies which can be used to help ensure the safety and reliability of industrial processes. Both are crucial for managing risks, but they serve different purposes and are used at different stages of the safety lifecycle. This post examines the key differences between HAZOP and SIL, their roles, methodologies, and how they complement each other in the context of process safety.

    The management of risks also involves the tight control of actions, and whichever method is applied, recording, tracking and reporting on high hazard actions will be part of the process.

    What is HAZOP?

    A HAZOP, or Hazard and Operability Study, is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation. The primary goal is to identify and evaluate potential hazards and operability problems that could lead to unsafe conditions or sub-optimal performance.

    HAZOP Methodology

    1. Team-Based Approach: HAZOP involves a multidisciplinary team that brings together diverse expertise. This team typically includes process engineers, operators, safety professionals, and other relevant stakeholders.
    2. Guide Words: The study uses predefined guide words (e.g., “no,” “more,” “less,” “as well as”) to systematically examine each part of the process. These guide words help in generating possible deviations from normal operations.
    3. Nodes: The process is divided into manageable sections called nodes. Each node is examined for deviations using the guide words.
    4. Deviations and Consequences: For each deviation identified, the team assesses potential causes and consequences. They also consider existing safeguards and suggest additional measures if necessary.
    Objectives:
    • Identify potential hazards and operability issues.
    • Understand the causes and consequences of deviations.
    • Recommend modifications or additional safeguards to mitigate risks.
    Applications:

    HAZOP is widely used in various industries, including chemical processing, pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, and power generation. It is typically conducted during the design phase of a new process or when significant modifications are made to an existing process.

    Meeting at laptop

    What is SIL?

    Safety Integrity Level (SIL) analysis, on the other hand, is a measure of the reliability and performance required from a safety instrumented function (SIF) to achieve or maintain a safe state for a process. SIL is part of the broader framework of functional safety, which is governed by standards such as IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.

    SIL Methodology

    1. Risk Assessment: The process begins with a thorough risk assessment to identify hazardous events and their potential consequences.
    2. Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA): LOPA is often used to determine the necessary risk reduction. This involves identifying and evaluating the various layers of protection in place (e.g., alarms, safety interlocks, physical barriers).
    3. Safety Requirements Specification (SRS): Based on the LOPA results, specific safety functions and their required performance levels are documented in an SRS.
    4. Determining SIL: The required SIL for each SIF is determined based on the necessary risk reduction. SIL levels range from SIL 1 (least stringent) to SIL 4 (most stringent), with each level representing an order of magnitude of risk reduction.
    Objectives:
    • Define the required performance of safety functions.
    • Ensure that safety systems are designed, implemented, and maintained to achieve the required risk reduction.
    Applications:

    SIL analysis is applied to safety instrumented systems (SIS) in industries such as oil and gas, chemicals, power generation, and manufacturing. It is used throughout the lifecycle of the SIS, from design and implementation to operation and maintenance.

    Key Differences Between HAZOP and SIL

    While both HAZOP and SIL are essential for process safety, they differ significantly in their focus, methodology, and application.

    Focus:
    • HAZOP: Focuses on identifying and analysing potential hazards and operability issues within a process.
    • SIL: Focuses on the performance and reliability of safety instrumented functions to achieve a defined level of risk reduction.
    Methodology:
    • HAZOP: Uses guide words to systematically explore deviations in process parameters.
    • SIL: Uses risk assessment techniques such as LOPA to determine the required safety performance of safety functions.
    Application:
    • HAZOP: Applied during the design phase of a process or when modifications are made, aiming to identify hazards and suggest mitigations.
    • SIL: Applied to the design, implementation, and maintenance of safety systems, ensuring they meet the required performance levels for risk reduction.
    Outcomes:
    • HAZOP: Results in a detailed understanding of potential hazards and recommendations for process modifications or additional safeguards.
    • SIL: Results in the specification of safety functions, their required performance levels, and verification that these levels are achieved and maintained.
    Team Composition:
    • HAZOP: Involves a multidisciplinary team with expertise in various aspects of the process.
    • SIL: Typically involves safety engineers and risk analysts who focus on the reliability and performance of safety systems.
    Standards and Guidelines:
    • HAZOP: Guided by standards such as IEC 61882, which provides a framework for conducting HAZOP studies.
    • SIL: Governed by standards such as IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, which define the requirements for achieving and maintaining functional safety.

    Process Engineering

    Complementary Roles of HAZOP and SIL

    Despite their differences, HAZOP and SIL are complementary tools in the process safety toolkit. HAZOP is often the first step in identifying potential hazards, which then informs the need for safety functions and their performance requirements. SIL analysis ensures that these safety functions are capable of providing the necessary risk reduction.

    For example, a HAZOP study might identify a potential overpressure scenario in a chemical reactor. The study could recommend a safety instrumented function, such as a pressure relief valve, to mitigate this risk. SIL analysis would then determine the required SIL level for this function, ensuring it is reliable enough to prevent the hazardous event.

    By integrating HAZOP and SIL, organisations can achieve a comprehensive understanding of their process risks and ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place. This integration is critical for achieving a high level of safety and operational reliability.

    Conclusion

    HAZOP and SIL are both integral to managing process safety, but they serve distinct purposes and are used at different stages of the safety lifecycle. HAZOP focuses on identifying and analysing potential hazards and operability issues, while SIL focuses on ensuring that safety systems achieve the required performance levels to reduce risk.

    Understanding the differences between these methodologies and how they complement each other is essential for anyone involved in process safety. By leveraging both HAZOP and SIL, organisations can effectively identify hazards, assess risks, and implement robust safety systems that protect people, the environment, and assets.

    Brainstorming Hazards

    The Difference between HAZOP and HAZID

    In the realm of process safety management, identifying and mitigating potential hazards is crucial to ensuring the safety and efficiency of industrial operations. Two primary methodologies used for this purpose are Hazard Identification (HAZID) and Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP).
    While both techniques aim to enhance safety by identifying potential risks, they differ significantly in their approach, application stages, and outcomes. This article delves into the nuances of HAZID and HAZOP, comparing their methodologies, applications, advantages, and limitations, and provides a detailed analysis of their respective roles in risk management.

    What is HAZID?

    HAZID, or Hazard Identification, is a preliminary risk assessment technique used to identify potential hazards in the early stages of a project. It is typically conducted during the conceptual design or feasibility study phase. The primary goal of HAZID is to identify all possible hazards that could impact the safety, environment, and operability of a facility. This early identification allows for the incorporation of safety measures into the project design before significant investments are made.

    HAZID studies are typically conducted through workshops involving a multidisciplinary team. The team brainstorms potential hazards using checklists, past experiences, and industry standards. This approach ensures a comprehensive identification of hazards that might affect the project.
    Advantages
    • Early Intervention: By identifying hazards early, design changes can be made before significant investments are committed. This proactive approach helps in embedding safety measures into the design, reducing the likelihood of costly modifications later in the project.
    • Broad Coverage: HAZID covers a wide range of potential hazards, including those related to safety, environment, and operability. This broad scope ensures that all potential risks are considered, providing a comprehensive understanding of the project’s risk profile.
    • Cost-Effective: Early identification of hazards can lead to cost savings by preventing expensive design modifications later in the project. By addressing hazards in the conceptual design phase, companies can avoid costly rework and delays during the later stages of the project.
    Limitations
    • Qualitative Nature: HAZID does not provide a detailed analysis of the consequences or likelihood of identified hazards. The qualitative nature of HAZID means that it provides a high-level understanding of risks but lacks the detailed analysis needed to develop specific mitigation measures.
    • Dependent on Expertise: The effectiveness of HAZID relies heavily on the experience and expertise of the team members. The quality of the hazard identification process depends on the knowledge and experience of the participants, making it essential to involve a multidisciplinary team with diverse expertise.

    Key Features of HAZID

    • Early Stage Analysis: Conducted at the beginning of a project to identify potential hazards early.
    • Broad Scope: Covers a wide range of potential hazards, including safety, environmental, and operational risks.
    • Qualitative Assessment: Focuses on identifying hazards rather than evaluating their consequences in detail.

    What is HAZOP?

    HAZOP, or Hazard and Operability Study, is a more detailed and systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operability issues in existing or planned processes. It is typically conducted during the detailed design phase or on existing processes to ensure safe and efficient operation. The primary goal of a HAZOP study is to identify deviations from the intended design that could lead to hazardous conditions or operability problems.
    HAZOP studies are more structured and detailed compared to HAZID. Using guide words such as “more,” “less,” “as well as,” and “instead of,” the team systematically explores possible deviations from the intended design. This method helps identify specific scenarios where deviations could lead to hazardous conditions or operability issues.

    Pipe in processing plant

    Advantages
    • Systematic Approach: The structured nature of HAZOP ensures that all possible deviations are considered. The use of guide words provides a systematic framework for identifying potential deviations, ensuring a comprehensive analysis of the process.
    • Detailed Analysis: HAZOP provides a thorough analysis of potential consequences and helps in developing specific recommendations for mitigation. The detailed nature of HAZOP allows for the identification of specific hazards and the development of targeted mitigation measures.
    • Improves Operability: By identifying operability issues, HAZOP helps ensure that the process runs smoothly and efficiently. The identification of operability issues can lead to improvements in process design, enhancing both safety and efficiency.
    Limitations
    • Time-Consuming: The detailed and systematic nature of HAZOP makes it a time-consuming process. Conducting a thorough HAZOP study requires significant time and effort, making it a resource-intensive process.
    • Requires Detailed Design: HAZOP cannot be effectively conducted without detailed design information, limiting its applicability in the early project stages. The need for detailed design information means that HAZOP is typically conducted during the detailed design phase or on operational processes.
    • Resource Intensive: The need for a multidisciplinary team and detailed analysis makes HAZOP more resource-intensive compared to HAZID. Conducting a HAZOP study requires the involvement of a multidisciplinary team with in-depth knowledge of the process, making it a resource-intensive process.

    Key Features of HAZOP

    • Detailed Analysis: Conducted during the detailed design phase or on operational processes to ensure safe operation.
    • Structured Approach: Uses guide words to systematically explore potential deviations from the design intent.
    • Focus on Deviations: Identifies deviations that could lead to hazards or operability issues.

    Applications

    Both HAZID and HAZOP are crucial for identifying hazards, but they are applied at different stages of a project and have distinct objectives.
    HAZID
    • Early Project Stages: Conducted during the conceptual design or feasibility study phase to identify potential hazards early.
    • Feasibility Studies: Helps in evaluating the feasibility of a project by identifying potential safety, environmental, and operational risks.
    • Conceptual Design Phase: Provides a broad understanding of risks, informing initial design decisions and safety measures.
    HAZOP
    • Detailed Design Phase: Conducted during the detailed design phase to identify deviations from the design intent and ensure safe operation.
    • Operational Processes: Applied to existing processes to identify potential hazards and operability issues.
    • Modification and Retrofit Projects: Used in projects involving modifications or retrofits to ensure that changes do not introduce new hazards.

    Pros and Cons of HAZID and HAZOP

    To better understand the strengths and weaknesses of HAZID and HAZOP, let’s compare their pros and cons.

    HAZID V HAZOP pros and cons table

    Case Study – Comparing HAZID and HAZOP for a Chemical Plant Expansion

    Background

    A chemical manufacturing company plans to expand its existing plant to increase production capacity. This expansion involves adding new reactors, storage tanks, and piping systems. The company is committed to maintaining high safety standards and decides to conduct both HAZID and HAZOP studies to identify and mitigate potential hazards associated with the expansion.

    HAZID Study

    Objective: Identify all potential hazards in the early stages of the project.

    Approach: A multidisciplinary team including process engineers, safety experts, and environmental specialists conducts a HAZID workshop. The team uses checklists, industry standards, and past experiences to brainstorm potential hazards.

    Findings:

    1. Chemical Release: Potential for toxic chemical releases during storage and handling.
    2. Fire and Explosion: Risks associated with flammable materials.
    3. Environmental Impact: Potential contamination of soil and water sources.
    4. Operational Hazards: Risks related to equipment failure and human error.

    Outcome: The HAZID study provides a broad overview of potential hazards. The findings are documented in a high-level risk register, which informs the initial design and layout of the new facilities. Safety measures such as proper storage containment, fire suppression systems, and emergency response plans are recommended for inclusion in the project design. These are tracked using an Action Tracking System.

    HAZOP Study

    Objective: Identify deviations from the design intent that could lead to hazardous conditions or operability issues.

    Approach: A detailed HAZOP study is conducted once the detailed design of the new facilities is completed. The same multidisciplinary team reviews the design using guide words (e.g., “more,” “less,” “none,” “reverse”) to systematically explore potential deviations.

    Findings:

    1. Overpressure in Reactors: Identified the need for additional pressure relief valves to prevent reactor overpressure.
    2. Incorrect Mixing Ratios: Discovered potential for incorrect chemical mixing due to control system failures, recommending improved automation and alarm systems.
    3. Valve Failures: Identified the risk of valve failures leading to chemical spills, suggesting the use of fail-safe valves and regular maintenance checks.
    4. Flow Restrictions: Noted potential for flow restrictions in new piping, leading to process inefficiencies, and recommended redesigning the piping layout to ensure smooth flow.

    Outcome: The HAZOP study provides a detailed analysis of specific process deviations and their potential consequences. Detailed recommendations for mitigation measures are developed, including design modifications, additional safety equipment, and improved operational procedures. These recommendations are recorded using an action tracking management system and implemented to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the expanded plant.

    Comparison and Highlights

    HAZID V HAZOP comparison table

    Key Differences Between HAZID & HAZOP Highlighted by the Case Study

    1. Stage of Application:
      • HAZID is used early in the project to provide a broad overview of potential hazards, influencing initial design decisions.
      • HAZOP is conducted later when detailed design information is available, focusing on specific deviations and their consequences.
    2. Level of Detail:
      • HAZID offers a qualitative, high-level identification of hazards.
      • HAZOP provides a detailed, structured analysis of potential deviations from the design intent.
    3. Outcome:
      • HAZID results in a high-level risk register and general safety recommendations.
      • HAZOP results in detailed recommendations for design modifications, additional safety equipment, and operational procedures.

    Understanding the Differences Between FMEA and Hazard Analysis

    In risk management and safety engineering, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Hazard Analysis (HA) are widely used methodologies. Both aim to identify potential failures and hazards within systems, processes, or designs, but they differ significantly in their approaches, applications, and outcomes. We’ll look at the key differences between FMEA and Hazard Analysis, exploring their methodologies, applications, advantages, and limitations.

    What is FMEA?

    FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) is a systematic method for evaluating processes to identify where and how they might fail and assessing the relative impact of different failures. It is primarily used to improve the quality, reliability, and safety of products or processes. FMEA can be applied during the design phase (Design FMEA) or the process phase (Process FMEA).

    Key Elements of FMEA

    1. Failure Modes: Potential ways in which a process or product could fail.
    2. Effects Analysis: The consequences of these failures on system operations, end-users, or product quality.
    3. Severity, Occurrence, and Detection: These factors are rated to calculate a Risk Priority Number (RPN) which prioritises issues that need addressing.
    4. Mitigation Actions: Steps to reduce or eliminate the potential failures identified.

    What is Hazard Analysis?

    Hazard Analysis (HA) is a broad methodology that encompasses various techniques used to identify potential hazards in systems, processes, or products. Unlike FMEA, which is a specific type of analysis, Hazard Analysis includes several methods such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and more. The main goal of Hazard Analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards to prevent accidents and ensure safety.

    Key Elements of Hazard Analysis

    1. Hazard Identification: Recognizing potential sources of harm or danger.
    2. Risk Assessment: Evaluating the likelihood and severity of hazards.
    3. Risk Control: Implementing measures to mitigate or eliminate identified hazards.
    4. Documentation and Review: Keeping detailed records of hazards and control measures, and reviewing them regularly.

    Methodological Differences Between FMEA & Hazard Analysis

    The fundamental difference between FMEA and Hazard Analysis lies in their scope and methodological approaches.

    FMEA Methodology

    FMEA is a bottom-up approach that focuses on individual components or steps in a process. It starts with identifying all possible failure modes for each component, analysing the effects of these failures, and then prioritising them based on severity, occurrence, and detection. This approach is more quantitative, as it involves calculating RPNs to prioritise risks.

    Steps in FMEA

    1. Identification: List all components or steps.
    2. Analysis: Identify potential failure modes for each component.
    3. Assessment: Evaluate the effects of each failure mode and rate them based on severity, occurrence, and detection.
    4. Prioritisation: Calculate RPNs and prioritise failure modes that need attention.
    5. Action: Develop and implement actions to mitigate high-priority risks.

    Hazard Analysis Methodology

    Hazard Analysis is a more flexible and comprehensive approach that can be tailored to different contexts and requirements. It can be top-down, bottom-up, or a combination of both, depending on the specific technique used. Here are brief descriptions of some common Hazard Analysis techniques:

    • Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA): A qualitative approach used early in the design phase to identify potential hazards and assess their severity.
    • Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): A top-down method that uses a tree-like diagram to analyse the pathways that can lead to a specific undesirable event.
    • Event Tree Analysis (ETA): A forward-looking approach that starts from an initiating event and examines possible outcomes using a tree structure.
    • Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP): A detailed, systematic examination of process deviations and their consequences.

    Steps in Hazard Analysis

    1. Preparation: Define the scope, select the appropriate technique, and gather relevant data.
    2. Hazard Identification: Systematically identify potential hazards using the chosen technique.
    3. Risk Assessment: Evaluate the likelihood and severity of identified hazards.
    4. Risk Control: Develop and implement measures to mitigate or eliminate hazards.
    5. Documentation and Review: Record findings and control measures, and review them periodically.

    The Role of Action Tracking

    Both approaches will inevitably require actions to be taken to either prevent failure or mitigate hazards. The Pisys Action Tracker has been used for FMEA, HAZOP and HAZID studies worldwide since 2001 and is the tool of choice for process safety professionals.

    Applications and Industry Use

    The choice between FMEA and Hazard Analysis often depends on the industry and specific application.

    FMEA Applications

    FMEA is versatile and can be applied across various industries, including automotive, aerospace, electronics, and manufacturing. It is particularly useful in:

    • Design Phase: Identifying potential design flaws and improving product reliability.
    • Process Improvement: Enhancing manufacturing processes by identifying and mitigating potential failures.
    • Maintenance: Developing preventive maintenance plans based on failure mode analysis.

    For example, in the automotive industry, FMEA might be used to analyse potential failures in a new braking system design. The analysis would identify failure modes such as brake fluid leakage, assess the severity of each failure mode (e.g., reduced braking efficiency or total brake failure), and prioritise actions to mitigate these risks, such as improving seal designs or using higher-quality materials.

    Hazard Analysis Applications

    Hazard Analysis is predominantly used in industries where safety is paramount, such as:

    • Chemical Processing: Identifying and mitigating risks in chemical plants.
    • Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: Ensuring safety and compliance in drug production processes.
    • Oil and Gas: Enhancing safety and operability in oil refineries and offshore platforms.
    • Aerospace: Ensuring the safety of aircraft design and operation.
    • Nuclear Power: Identifying and mitigating potential risks in nuclear power plants.

    For instance, in a chemical plant, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) might be used during the design phase to identify potential chemical spill hazards. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) could be applied to analyze the causes of a potential reactor explosion, while Event Tree Analysis (ETA) might be used to examine the possible outcomes of a valve failure. Each technique provides a different perspective on hazards and helps to develop a comprehensive risk management strategy.

    Advantages and Limitations

    Both FMEA and Hazard Analysis have their unique advantages and limitations.

    FMEA Advantages

    • Quantitative Analysis: Provides a numerical basis for prioritising risks.
    • Broad Applicability: Can be used in various phases and industries.
    • Preventive Approach: Focuses on preventing failures before they occur.

    FMEA Limitations

    • Resource Intensive: Can be time-consuming and requires detailed knowledge of the system.
    • Component Focus: May overlook system-level interactions and holistic process issues.

    Hazard Analysis Advantages

    • Comprehensive Approach: Can be tailored to different contexts and needs.
    • Versatility: Includes various techniques for different types of hazards.
    • System-Level Perspective: Considers both component-level and system-level hazards.

    Hazard Analysis Limitations

    • Complexity: Can be complex and require significant expertise to conduct effectively.
    • Qualitative Nature: Some techniques rely on qualitative assessments, which may be subjective.
    • Resource Intensive: Can be time-consuming and require detailed data and multidisciplinary teams.

    Choosing Between FMEA and Hazard Analysis

    Selecting between FMEA and Hazard Analysis depends on the specific context and requirements of the project.

    • Use FMEA When:
      • A detailed, component-level analysis is needed.
      • Quantitative prioritisation of risks is required.
      • The focus is on product design, process improvement, or preventive maintenance.

    • Use Hazard Analysis When:
      • A comprehensive, system-level examination is necessary.
      • The project involves complex processes with significant hazards.
      • A flexible approach is needed to tailor the analysis to specific hazards.

    Integrating FMEA and Hazard Analysis

    In some cases, integrating both FMEA and Hazard Analysis can provide a more comprehensive risk analysis. For example, an organisation might use FMEA during the design phase of a new product to identify potential component failures and then apply Hazard Analysis during the operational phase to examine system-level hazards. This dual approach ensures that both product reliability and system safety are thoroughly addressed.

    For instance, in the aerospace industry, FMEA might be used to analyse potential failures in a new aircraft engine design, identifying specific component failures like turbine blade fractures. Subsequently, Hazard Analysis techniques like Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) could be used to explore the broader consequences of an engine failure during flight, considering system-level interactions and potential cascading effects.

    Conclusion

    FMEA and Hazard Analysis are both vital tools in risk management and safety engineering. While FMEA offers a structured, quantitative approach to identifying and mitigating potential failures at the component level, Hazard Analysis provides a flexible, comprehensive examination of hazards at both the component and system levels. Understanding their differences, methodologies, applications, and limitations is crucial for selecting the appropriate tool to ensure safety, reliability, and efficiency in various industries. By leveraging the strengths of each methodology, organisations can better anticipate and mitigate risks, ultimately enhancing their overall operational safety and performance.

    Whether choosing FMEA, Hazard Analysis, or a combination of both, the key is to systematically and thoroughly analyse potential risks, implement effective mitigation strategies, and foster a culture of continuous improvement and safety awareness.

    industrial plant

    Understanding Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

    Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a crucial concept in industrial safety, especially in high-risk sectors like chemical processing, oil and gas, nuclear power, and transportation. It quantifies the level of risk reduction provided by safety functions, guiding the design and implementation of systems to ensure acceptable safety levels. SIL is governed by international standards such as IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, which focus on the functional safety of electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic systems.

    The Concept of Safety Integrity Level

    SIL represents a discrete level for specifying the safety integrity requirements of safety functions allocated to Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) systems. The levels range from SIL 1 to SIL 4, with SIL 4 indicating the highest level of safety integrity and SIL 1 the lowest. Determining a SIL involves assessing the probability of failure on demand (PFD) and the frequency of operation, crucial for understanding potential system failures and their impacts.

    Key Components of SIL

    1. Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD): PFD measures the likelihood that a safety system
      will fail to perform its required function when needed. Each SIL corresponds to a specific PFD range, with lower values indicating higher reliability.

    2. Risk Reduction Factor (RRF): RRF is the inverse of PFD, representing the risk reduction due to the safety function. For instance, a system with a PFD of 0.01 (SIL 2) has an RRF of 100, meaning it reduces the risk by a factor of 100.

    3. Safety Lifecycle: The safety lifecycle includes phases such as hazard and risk assessment, system design and implementation, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning, ensuring comprehensive safety management from conception to decommissioning.

    4. Functional Safety Standards: Standards like IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 provide guidelines for achieving SIL compliance, covering safety requirements specification, design, validation, and maintenance.

    Adopting best practices relating to SIL will involve management of actions – whether from HAZOPS, risk assessments, reviews etc. These actions need to be carefully managed to ensure that they are completed within required timescales and that bottlenecks are clearly visible.

    Using appropriate software can help to keep control of safety-critical actions and improve overall visibility of the processes involved in reducing risk.

    Understanding Safety Functions

    A safety function is a specific action or set of actions performed by a system to prevent or mitigate hazardous events. These functions are crucial for maintaining safety in industrial processes and can be broadly categorised into several types:

    1. Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD): Designed to safely shut down a process or operation in case of an emergency, preventing accidents or minimizing their impact. For example, an ESD might automatically shut down a chemical reactor if it detects excessive pressure or temperature.

    2. Fire and Gas Systems (FGS): Detect fires or gas leaks and initiate appropriate actions such as activating alarms, shutting down equipment, or triggering fire suppression systems. These systems are vital in industries where flammable materials are handled.

    3. Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS): A broader category that includes systems designed to monitor process variables and take corrective actions to maintain safe operating conditions. SIS can include pressure relief systems, temperature control systems, and other automated safety measures.

    4. Pressure Relief Systems: These systems protect equipment and personnel by relieving excess pressure in vessels or pipelines. They often include pressure relief valves, rupture disks, and vent systems.

    5. Control Systems: Implement control loops to maintain process variables within safe limits. For example, a temperature control system might adjust the flow of coolant to prevent overheating in a reactor.

    Determining SIL Requirements

    The process involves several steps:

    1. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment: Identifying potential hazards and assessing risks using techniques like Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA).

    2. Risk Analysis: Quantifying risks in terms of frequency and severity to understand hazard impacts and the need for risk reduction.

    3. Risk Reduction Measures: Identifying appropriate measures, including non-technical solutions (e.g., administrative controls) and technical solutions (e.g., safety instrumented systems).

    4. SIL Determination: Using methods like risk graphs and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) to assign SIL levels to safety functions based on required risk reduction (Fig 1).

    Figure 1 – LOPA – Layers of protection

    SIL Levels and Their Implications

    Each SIL level has specific implications:

    • SIL 1: PFD 0.1 to 0.01. Provides basic risk reduction, requiring less stringent design and testing.

    • SIL 2: PFD 0.01 to 0.001. Requires moderate risk reduction, with more rigorous design and testing.

    • SIL 3: PFD 0.001 to 0.0001. Provides high risk reduction, necessitating stringent design, testing, and maintenance.

    • SIL 4: PFD 0.0001 to 0.00001. Represents the highest risk reduction, requiring the most rigorous processes.

    Practical Application of SIL

    Implementing SIL involves:

    1. Design and Engineering: Ensuring design compliance with the required SIL, selecting appropriate components, and designing fault-tolerant architectures.

    2. Validation and Verification: Rigorous testing under various conditions to ensure compliance with required SIL.

    3. Operation and Maintenance: Regular testing, inspection, and maintenance to ensure ongoing compliance.

    4. Documentation and Training: Comprehensive documentation and training to ensure proper operation and maintenance.

    Case Study: SIL in the Process Industry

    In the process industry, SIL is applied to safety instrumented systems (SIS) controlling critical processes, such as the shutdown of reactors in chemical plants during abnormal operating conditions.
     
    A Safety Instrumented System is an engineered set of hardware and software controls used to achieve or maintain a safe state of a process when predetermined conditions are violated. SIS functions by detecting abnormal conditions and initiating pre-defined actions to prevent accidents. These actions can include shutting down equipment, venting gases, or activating alarms to alert operators to take corrective measures.

    1. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment: A HAZOP study identifies potential hazards such as overpressure in a reactor. The risk assessment quantifies the potential impact and likelihood of an overpressure event.

    2. Risk Reduction Measures: The risk analysis might determine that existing control systems are insufficient, necessitating additional measures like an SIS.

    3. SIL Determination: Using methods like LOPA, the required SIL for the SIS is determined. Suppose the analysis indicates that the risk reduction needed corresponds to SIL 3. This means the SIS must achieve a PFD between 0.001 and 0.0001.

    4. Design and Engineering: The SIS is designed to meet SIL 3 requirements, involving the selection of reliable components and the implementation of fault-tolerant architectures.

    5. Validation and Verification: The SIS undergoes extensive testing to ensure it meets SIL 3 standards, including functional and scenario-based testing.

    6. Operation and Maintenance: A maintenance schedule is implemented to include regular testing and inspection of the SIS to ensure it continues to meet SIL 3 requirements.

    7. Documentation and Training: Detailed documentation of the SIS design, testing, and maintenance procedures is maintained, and personnel are trained in the operation and maintenance of the SIS.

    Challenges and SIL Best Practices

    Implementing and maintaining SIL-compliant systems comes with challenges:

    1. Complexity: Higher SIL levels require more complex designs and rigorous testing, making management challenging.

    2. Cost: Achieving higher SIL levels involves significant costs for design, testing, and maintenance, necessitating a balance between safety and cost.

    3. Regulatory Compliance: Ensuring compliance with standards like IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 requires ongoing effort.

    4. Human Factors: Human error can impact the effectiveness of safety systems, emphasising the need for comprehensive training and clear procedures.

    Best Practices Include

    • Early Involvement: Involving safety engineers early ensures safety requirements are integrated into the design from the beginning.

    • Regular Reviews: Conducting regular safety reviews and audits helps identify potential issues and ensures ongoing compliance with SIL requirements.

    • Continuous Improvement: Implementing a culture of continuous improvement helps organisations adapt to changing safety requirements and technological advancements.

    • Stakeholder Engagement: Engaging all stakeholders ensures a comprehensive understanding of safety requirements and fosters a culture of safety.

    Action Tracking Software

    The Pisys Action Tracker is Action Tracking Management Software (ATMS) used by thousands of safety professionals worldwide to ensure that high-governance actions are appropriately managed. Read how Wood plc use Action Tracker for its effectiveness in ensuring safety, and improving oversight across global operations.

     
     

    From HAZOP to SIMOP – Understanding Key HSE Terms For Action Management

    The HSE industry is not unique in its use of acronyms to describe key processes/methods etc, but it must have more than most. In an action management system, when a specific action needs to be undertaken, completed and tracked, it is vital that everyone involved understands exactly what is required. 

    I remember working for an offshore survey company in the 80’s and plucking up the courage to ask someone what ‘KP’ meant (it means ‘Kilometer Post’ in case you’re interested!) This was important information that I wish someone had told me up front and I’m sure the same thing happens in all kinds of professions.

    We want to help avoid those tricky conversations so we’ve put together a short (and definitely not comprehensive) list of the key terms we’ve seen in the last 20 years of delivering our ATMS action tracker. One thing that relates all of these is that they can all result in an action (or actions) which has to be performed and closed out. ATMS was built to handle any type of action but the list below represents what are probably the most frequent action types our clients deal with.

    HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study)

    HAZOP is a detailed, systematic method used to identify potential hazards and operability problems within industrial processes. It involves a team reviewing process designs and identifying what could go wrong if there are deviations from normal operating conditions. Each scenario is assessed for potential causes and consequences, helping to develop strategies to mitigate these risks.

    HAZID (Hazard Identification Study)

    HAZID is used to identify hazards in the early stages of project design and planning. It involves a team that assesses scenarios that could lead to hazardous events. Hazards are ranked based on their potential impacts and likelihood, guiding the prioritisation of safety measures.

    SIL (Safety Integrity Level)

    SIL refers to levels of risk reduction provided by a safety function. SIL levels range from 1 to 4, with SIL 4 representing the highest degree of safety. The level is determined based on a target failure measure; higher SIL levels correspond to lower probabilities of failure on demand.

    LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis)

    LOPA is used to analyse and ensure adequate safety levels in processes involving high-risk scenarios. It assesses existing safety layers and determines if additional measures are required, providing a methodical approach to achieve acceptable risk levels.

    MOC (Management of Change)

    MOC is a structured system that manages safety, health, and environmental risks associated with changes in processes, personnel, or equipment. It ensures all changes undergo thorough review and approval processes to maintain safety and compliance.

    ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)

    ALARP is a principle that aims to minimise risks as much as feasibly possible, balancing risk reduction against effort, time, and the costs of achieving it. It’s widely used in risk management to ensure that risk levels are both tolerable and cannot be reduced further without an inordinate amount of resources.

    BowTie

    The Bowtie Risk Assessment Method is a powerful visual tool used for analysing and managing specific risks. It graphically depicts the relationship between potential hazards, their possible causes, the resulting events, and their consequences, creating a “bowtie” shape. At the centre of the bowtie, the hazard is linked to a top event, which represents a critical point where control is lost. On the left side, preventive barriers are placed to stop the top event from occurring, while on the right side, mitigative barriers are set up to reduce the impact if the top event does occur. This method helps organisations clearly understand and communicate risk management strategies, identify weaknesses in controls, and prioritise safety measures by visually mapping out the pathways from hazards to potential impacts.

    HIRA (Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment)

    HIRA is a comprehensive approach that involves identifying potential hazards and assessing the risks associated with these hazards in a workplace or during a project lifecycle. It helps in determining appropriate ways to eliminate or control the risks.

    SIMOPS (Simultaneous Operations)

    SIMOPS refer to the practice of performing multiple operations concurrently at a single facility or location. These operations often pose intersecting risks, requiring careful coordination and robust safety protocols to manage the increased risk potential effectively.

    EERA (Escape, Evacuation, and Rescue Analysis)

    EERA focuses on designing strategies for personnel safety during emergency situations. It involves assessing the effectiveness of escape routes, evacuation procedures, and rescue options available on facilities, particularly in the offshore industry.

    ESSA (Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis)

    ESSA, or Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis, is crucial in assessing the robustness and effectiveness of emergency systems under potential hazard conditions. This analysis involves evaluating the ability of critical systems to continue functioning during and after an emergency event. The focus is on ensuring that essential systems such as fire suppression, alarms, communication networks, and emergency power supplies remain operational during disasters to facilitate safe evacuation and emergency responses. ESSA is integral to designing facilities that can withstand adverse conditions, thereby enhancing the overall safety of the operation and its personnel.

    When you are managing actions or tracking progress of actions, it is helpful to understand exactly what you are tracking and in the HSE field, where the safety of individuals is at stake, the clearer you can be, the better.  These acronyms are commonly used in an action management system, and so you will be familiar with them when you next encounter them during your work.

    Alllocating tasks to team members

    Common challenges in HAZOP action tracking

    Introduction:

    Identifying possible risks and operability problems in a variety of sectors can be done using the well-established HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) technique. To create a safe and effective working environment, potential dangers must first be identified. Organisations must monitor the activities and suggestions that come from the HAZOP study after it is finished to make sure that they are carried out and that the identified hazards are successfully controlled. Unfortunately, keeping track of HAZOP actions may be difficult, and organisations frequently encounter a number of challenges that can make it tricky to set up and keep up an efficient action monitoring system. In this article, we'll talk about some of the typical problems with monitoring HAZOP actions that organisations run into and offer solutions.

    Challenges in HAZOP Action Tracking:

    Lack of Ownership:

    Lack of ownership is one of the biggest problems with HAZOP action monitoring. A lot of the time, responsibility and ownership for the behaviours noted in the HAZOP research are unclear. As a result, delegating tasks to certain people or teams and keeping track of progress might be difficult.

    It is crucial to create unambiguous ownership for each action in order to overcome this difficulty. This can be accomplished by designating a specific individual or team to complete each step and by establishing clear expectations and completion dates. To make sure that everyone involved is informed of the status of each action, it may also be beneficial to set up a system for tracking progress and giving frequent updates.

    Inadequate Resources:

    Lack of resources is a typical problem in HAZOP activity tracking. Organisations might not have the necessary staff, resources, or time to successfully monitor and carry out all of the suggested tasks. A backlog of tasks may be created as a result, which can be daunting and challenging to manage.

    Prioritising actions according to their amount of risk and potential impact is crucial to overcoming this obstacle. This will assist organisations in directing their resources towards the most important tasks first. Establishing a system for classifying actions according to their importance and allocating resources in accordance with that classification may also be useful.

    Poor Communication:

    In HAZOP action tracking, good communication is essential, but poor communication can be very difficult. Making ensuring that everyone participating in the HAZOP research is aware of the suggested steps and giving updates and progress reports might be tough.

    Establishing open lines of communication and making sure that everyone involved in the HAZOP research is aware of the suggested activities and their associated timeframes are crucial for overcoming this obstacle. A mechanism for monitoring progress and informing all stakeholders on a regular basis may also be beneficial.

    Lack of Integration:

    Many of the recommendations and actions that are frequently identified by HAZOP studies may need to be implemented across various teams or departments within an organisation. Unfortunately, it may be difficult to implement recommendations in a consistent and effective manner because different departments may have their own processes and procedures.

    It is crucial to make sure that HAZOP guidelines and actions are incorporated into current processes and procedures in order to solve this difficulty. To do this, it is necessary to create effective channels of communication across teams and departments and to make sure that everyone taking part in the implementation process is aware of the suggested course of action.

    Limited Accountability:

    Lack of accountability is another frequent issue in HAZOP action monitoring. It can be difficult to guarantee that actions are completed on time and that the highlighted hazards are adequately controlled in the absence of clear accountability.

    The key to overcoming this obstacle is to clearly define who is responsible for each action. This can be done by allocating tasks to particular people or teams, as well as by outlining the expectations and completion dates for each task. To make sure that everyone engaged is informed, it may also be beneficial to set up a system for monitoring progress and sending frequent updates.

    The Pisys HAZOP action tracker has helped organisations world-wide to effectively manage critical HAZOP actions in an extremely simple and secure way. Please get in touch for more details or to organise a demo.